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Abstract: This paper details the emergence and role of the ‘Developmental State’ in 
East Asia and assesses whether it is compatible with processes assocated with 
‘globalisation’. The paper argues that despite the fact that the power and authority of 
states generally has been undermined by globalisation, and more general governance 
problems in the region, much of Southeast Asia still needs an effective developmental 
state. 
 
One of the most remarkable and surprising aspects of international economic 
development in the post-World War II period has been the rise of East Asia. A region 
that observers like Karl Marx and Max Weber once regarded as synonymous with a 
form of incurable ‘Oriental’ backwardness rapidly transformed itself into the most 
dynamic economic region on the planet. Even the financial and political crises that hit 
parts of the region in the late 1990s failed either to stop the broadly based processes of 
economic expansion that had taken hold in East Asia, or to erase the very real gains 
that had been made there over the preceding thirty of forty years. The big question, of 
course, is how did much of East Asia manage to pull off such a feat? This is an 
especially important question at a time when some observers think that the sorts of 
‘interventionist’ policies associated with East Asia’s most successful phase of 
development are no longer compatible with an increasingly integrated international 
political economy.  
 
In addressing these issues the first part of this chapter initially provides both a brief 
overview of the ‘developmental state’ that was at the centre of East Asia’s rapid 
growth, and the precise circumstances that allowed it to flourish. The important point 
that emerges here is that East Asia’s most successful economies were not just the 
beneficiaries of enlightened and effective public policy – although that plainly helped 
– they were also advantaged by a specific, possibly unique, set of geopolitical 
circumstances that allowed the distinctive, close relations between political and 
economic forces that are so characteristic of the region. In short, East Asian style 
state-led development was feasible for much of the post-war period partly because it 
was tolerated by the United States, the hegemonic power of the era, and because the 
expanding world economy facilitated export-oriented industrialisation. Neither of 
these fundamental  preconditions look as certain or benign at present. To illustrate 
how this change has come about, the second part of the paper examines a number of 
factors – some domestic, some external – which have significantly undermined both 
the efficacy and legitimacy of the developmental state in East Asia. Nevertheless, the 
central argument that this chapter advances is that, even in an increasingly global 
political-economy, states still have the potential capacity to significantly influence 
economic outcomes. Whether such interventions are considered to be appropriate, 
useful or effective will remain as much a normative judgement as it is a ‘technical’ 
one, but in the case of the less economically developed Southeast part of the region at 
least, effective state-led development may still have a critical role to play. 
 
The Developmental State in Historical Context 
 
At the outset it is important to acknowledge that the evolution of the state as the 
definitive form of political organisation in ‘the West’ and latterly the rest of the world 
is one that is intimately associated with the emergence and global spread of 
capitalism.1 While there may be important and continuing differences in the way 
broadly capitalist economic systems are organised in different parts of the world, to 
operate effectively and with certainty, participants in any sort of market economy are 
highly dependent on political authorities to provide the basic institutional and legal 
infrastructure markets alone cannot supply.  One of the defining public policy 
questions of the past couple of decades – a question given greater urgency by the 
rapid economic transformation of much of East Asia – has been about the extent and 
nature of the state’s role. To understand the precise nature of the part played by the 
state in East Asia’s general development, and why such a role might no longer be 
considered feasible or appropriate, we need to place the entire developmental 
experience in its specific historical context. In this regard, a number of internal and 
external factors have had a decisive influence in shaping the overall environment 
within which the developmental state emerged in East Asia. 
 
The defining feature of the international order that emerged in the aftermath of World 
War II was the Cold War confrontation between the United States and the Soviet 
Union. As far as the emergence of the developmental state in East Asia was 
concerned, this geopolitical stand-off was crucial for a number of reasons. First, and 
most importantly, the Manichean struggle with the Soviet Union meant that the 
United States privileged security issues and the cultivation of successful capitalist 
allies over questions of ideological purity. In the context of East Asia this meant that 
throughout the Cold War successive American administrations were prepared to 
overlook political practices and forms of economic organisation which they did not 
necessarily approve. Even though the distinctive forms of social organisation that 
emerged in East Asia might not have accorded with the creation of the sort of  liberal 
international order American policymakers wanted to create, they were tolerated if 
they helped consolidate the capitalist camp. The second reason why the Cold War 
environment was so conducive to the developmental strategies of those East Asian 
nations aligned with the United States was that American power, aid and assistance 
underpinned the ‘golden age’ of post-war capitalism from which a number of East 
Asian states were able to benefit.2 
 
The potential importance of these inter-connected regional and transnational or 
systemic factors can be seen in the case of the archetypal and pioneering 
developmental state: Japan. Whatever problems Japan may currently be experiencing, 
its metamorphosis from the devastation of its war-time defeat to become the second 
largest economy in the world within the space of about a quarter of a century was 
historically unprecedented and remains a stunning achievement. Although its 
neighbours South Korea and Taiwan have subsequently managed to achieve even 
more rapid rates of economic development and industrialisation, they did so by 
following a Japanese blue-print of state-led development,3 rather than the sort of 
neoliberal, market-centred orthodoxy that has become so influential across much of 
the Western world and which is so assiduously promoted by the United States and key 
institutional allies like the International Monetary Fund. 
 
How did Japan do it? At the centre of Japan’s post-war renaissance was what 
Chalmers Johnson famously dubbed the developmental state.4 In essence, the ‘secret’ 
of Japan’s success was that it was planned. Powerful bureaucratic agencies like the 
Ministry International Trade and Industry (MITI) and the Ministry of Finance (MOF) 
systematically attempted to implement a vision of long-term economic expansion and 
up-grading to provide the basis for a modern industrial economy. They were able to 
do so for a number of reasons that merit emphasis: most fundamentally, Japan’s post-
war political and bureaucratic elites not only had the requisite desire to guide the 
course of development, they also had the capacity. At a pragmatic level, the idea of 
‘state capacity’ simply means a particular government’s ability to conceive and 
implement policy. At a conceptual level, however, the notion of state capacity directs 
our attention toward the precise circumstances, tools, strategies and relationships that 
distinguish and effectively constitute different national  approaches to successful 
economic development. It is worth briefly spelling out the manner in which these 
relationships have been conceptualised as they can help us to understand the basis for, 
and possible merits of, state intervention, both in the past and in the context of an 
increasingly integrated international political economy. 
 
In one influential reading of economic development, the key variable determining 
successful and unsuccessful development outcomes is state policy, the effectiveness 
of which is determined by the degree of ‘embedded autonomy’ the state enjoys. The 
state must establish ‘institutionalised channels for the continual negotiation and 
renegotiation of goals and policies’, 5 which are sufficiently close to allow it to 
implement policy, but not so close that it is ‘captured’ by vested economic interests. 
When the developmental state was at its most effective and successful in Northeast 
Asia during the 1950s, ’60s and ’70s, the ability of the state in Japan, Korea, Taiwan 
and even Southeast Asia’s Singapore to establish ‘pilot agencies’ to guide 
development and implement policy was clearly a crucial part of their respective 
economic expansions.6 While all of this may have been couched in the rhetoric of ‘the 
national interest’ and made easier by the perceived need for nationally-based 
economic development in the face of growing international economic competition, it 
is important to recognise that East Asian states had powerful policy tools at their 
disposal which made the cooperation of indigenous business more likely: access to 
cheap capital, protection from external competition, and assisted access to export 
markets were all levers that states could use to ensure business compliance with 
governmental goals. 
 
It is also important to stress that in much of East Asia ‘strong’ states were not looked 
on with alarm, nor were their interventions in economic process regarded as 
illegitimate. This was especially true when rapid economic growth appeared to 
validate such strategies and the ‘late’ developer status of the region as a whole meant 
that policies necessary for ‘catching up’ were comparatively easy to formulate.7 
Consequently, much of East Asia was able to replicate the experience of the 
‘developed’ world, facilitate industrial development through technological adaptation, 
and integrate national economies into the wider international system on favourable 
terms through a judicious use of trade and industry policies. The situation presently  
confronting the political elites of East Asia is a good deal more complex and the 
concomitant role for states is less clear. The current challenges can be summed up in 
one word: globalisation. 
 
East Asia in an Era of Globalisation 
 
‘Globalisation’ is, of course, what social scientists like to refer to as an ‘essentially 
contested concept’. Although its meaning may be less clear than we might like, its 
extent contested, and its precise periodisation unclear, globalisation is, nevertheless, a 
convenient shorthand for a number of processes that have become more influential 
and intense over the last few decades. For the purposes of this chapter globalisation is 
taken to refer to the array of social, political and economic processes that transcend 
national borders and which reflexively connect hitherto discrete parts of the world in 
new and complex ways.  
 
As far as East Asia is concerned, the most important aspect of those processes 
subsumed under the globalisation rubric has been economic. Although East Asia 
generally and the role of the developmental state in particular  is a powerful reminder 
that economic and political processes are inseparable, mutually constitutive forces,8 it 
is still useful to highlight a number of developments that can be considered as 
primarily economic. To make this point clearer, it is necessary to make two further 
analytical distinctions First, it is important to distinguish between the ‘real’ or 
industrial economy and the financial sector, the latter being manifest principally in a 
range of transnational capital flows and the operations of international money 
markets. Both industrial restructuring and the spectacular growth of the  financial 
sector have had a powerful impact on the East Asian region and the capacity of states 
to manage, or indeed take advantage of, forces that emanate from outside formerly 
discrete national economies. The second point to highlight about the East Asian 
region and the differential impact of global forces is that the region itself is far from 
homogenous and is characterised by great variations in developmental outcomes and 
state capacities. It is possible, however, to make a very broad brush distinction 
between those countries of Northeast Asia discussed above which industrialised in the 
early post-war period, and the ‘late-late’ industrialisers of Southeast Asia, which did 
not generally experience significant industrialisation until twenty years or so ago. 
With these caveats in mind, it is possible to identify a number of transnational trends 
and forces that have been influential in shaping not only economic outcomes, but 
which have also helped determine the role or regional states, too.  
 
International restructuring and East Asia 
 
There is little doubt that East Asia as a whole has benefited enormously from the 
transformation of trade and production in the real economy that has taken place in the 
post-war period. The economic expansion that occurred in North America and 
Western Europe created lucrative new markets which provided the basis for 
successive waves of export-oriented industrialisation, initially in Japan and the rest of 
Northeast Asia, and more recently in Southeast Asia. This remarkable, regionally-
based transformation attracted increased scholarly attention, which highlighted the 
crucial role of the state in encouraging the development of export-oriented indigenous 
industries whilst simultaneously protecting domestic markets from foreign 
competition.9 Inevitably, perhaps, those countries that found themselves running 
growing trade deficits with East Asia became increasingly disgruntled. Throughout 
the 1980s, as concerns about the relative performance of the American economy 
became a prominent issue, enormous political pressure was placed on Japan in 
particular to reform its economy and open up to foreign competition.  
 
The point to emphasise, therefore, is that whilst many of the decisions which drove 
the process of post-war international restructuring were taken by the heads of 
multinational corporations in the private sector, they did so in a politically 
conditioned environment. While the connection between state actors and the private 
sector may have been most overt and institutionalised in East Asia, American foreign 
policy was also clearly intended to advantage politically powerful ‘national 
champions’ in the United States. In other words, all states are interested in trying to 
advantage indigenous firms in an increasingly competitive international environment; 
the big question is about the guiding rationale that informs policy. Understood in this 
context, ‘globalisation’ is not simply a process determined solely by what Marxists 
might describe as the logic of capital accumulation, or – more simply – by the 
imperatives of international corporate competition. On the contrary, states – in the 
politically powerful industrialised economies, at least - have a continuing capacity to 
shape the national and transnational regulatory frameworks within which such 
processes occur.10 
 
The result of this interplay between political and corporate power at both the national 
and transnational levels is complex and occasionally paradoxical. On the one hand, 
there is a surprising degree of continuity and distinctiveness in the style of corporate 
activities in countries like Japan and South Korea, where large industrial 
conglomerates continue to dominate the economic landscape, and long-term 
relationships remain important.11 On the other hand, long–run changes in the overall 
international political economy – often the result of precisely the sort of political 
reformist pressures previously mentioned – have begun to unravel the entrenched, 
institutionalised relationships between corporate players, and between the economic 
and political actors that have been such a central part of many East Asian political-
economies. In Japan, for example, long considered to be the most distinctive, non 
market-oriented system in Asia, there is compelling evidence that its famous keiretsu 
networks of inter-connected corporate entities are being eroded by increased levels of 
foreign ownership and the fact that governments can no longer offer such attractive 
incentives to, or constraints over, powerful corporations that have an increasing global 
logic and which can easily raise capital on international financial markets.12  
 
While the deeply institutionalised basis of the distinctive forms of capitalism found in 
the region will ensure that a radical transformation of national political practices and 
economic structures is simply not possible in the short-term,13 there are clearly longer 
term forces at work that are eroding national distinctiveness and identification. This 
can be seen in the development of East Asia’s other unique form of economic and 
social organisation: ‘Chinese’ capitalism. The dominance of ethnic Chinese business 
interests in a number of Southeast Asia economies like Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand 
and the Philippines has long been recognised, as has the importance of personal 
connections in consolidating economic and political relationships. Significantly, 
however, globalisation in general and the recent economic crisis in particular appear 
to have engendered a significant change in both the attitudes of many Chinese 
business people and the strategies they employ as a consequence. Yeung argues that 
‘globalisation’ is being used discursively ‘as an external “objective” force to 
discipline corrupted and statist economies in the region’.14 This is especially 
significant in a Southeast Asian context where political and economic power has 
frequently fused to create a pattern of ‘embedded mercantilism’, in which the state has 
protected local business from external competition in a mutually rewarding 
symbiosis.15 If ‘domestic’ business now considers that the logic of international 
restructuring means that alliances with local political elites no longer offer the 
benefits they once did, and may in fact have become liabilities, this places a major 
question mark over the sustainability existent patterns of political and economic 
organisation and about the concomitant role of the state. 
 
Given the frequently self-serving, if not unambiguously corrupt nature of business-
government relations in parts of East Asia, their erosion may not seem to be such a 
bad thing. Certainly, powerful external agencies like the IMF, the World Bank and the 
United States Treasury Department were keen to attribute the economic crisis of the 
late 1990s to problems of indigenous governance and corporate organisation, rather 
than to systemic problems within the wider international political economy.16 While 
‘crony capitalism’ clearly has been a problem in parts of the region, it needs to be 
emphasised that not only were the causes of the crisis much more complex than 
orthodox IMF-style analyses imply, but it has been persuasively argued that in some 
circumstances what the less developed economies of Southeast Asia actually need is 
more state ‘intervention’ rather than less.17 To see why, we need to look at the other 
major element of economic globalisation: the financial sector. 
 
The financial sector in  East Asia 
 
The financial sector is the area of international economic activity that has become 
most ‘global’ and mobile, and has grown enormously in scale and scope. One of the 
most important theoretical and pragmatic questions to emerge from this 
transformation has been about its possible impact on the state, with some observers 
considering that the ‘structural’ power of global finance heralds an inevitable 
diminution of state power.18 For a region in which the state has sought to play an 
active role in economic management, this is potentially a major challenge to both the 
traditional style of governance in East Asia, and to the legitimacy of the state itself as 
a consequence.  
 
The potential significance of this point becomes clearer when we remember how the 
most successful development state operated at the height of its powers. One of the 
reasons Japanese state officials were able to implement their plans for the 
development of the ‘strategic’ industries that would provide the backbone of a modern 
industrial economy was because they had leverage over domestic business. Until the 
1970s, the Japanese financial system was relatively insulated and autonomous. In 
such circumstances, MITI and the MOF were able to re-cycle Japan’s famously high 
levels of domestic savings to targeted domestic industrial sectors and businesses. 
Business cooperated because it had access to capital at ‘artificially’ low interest rates, 
which gave them a potentially  important advantage over established rivals elsewhere. 
Governmental control of the domestic banking system ensured that indigenous 
financial institutions cooperated in providing funds to industry, something that helped 
to consolidate the close ties between industrial and financial capital that was so 
characteristic of Japan during the boom years. 
 
 It is difficult to generalise about the financial systems of a region a diverse as East 
Asia, which contains countries at very different levels of economic development, to 
say nothing of highly diverse political systems and state capacities. What we can say, 
however, is that across much of the region the Japanese exemplar, high domestic 
savings rates, and a general desire accelerate the development process led to broadly  
similar patterns of state intervention in Korea, Taiwan, China, Singapore, Indonesia, 
Thailand and Malaysia, in which states repressed interest rates, directed credit and 
used capital controls to guide the course of economic development.19 True, there may 
be important differences in places like Korea and Singapore where foreign capital has 
played a more important part in development, in resource-dependent Indonesia where 
the price of oil has critically influenced government autonomy, and in China, which is 
still nominally communist, but the overall contrast between East Asia and the market-
oriented Anglo-American economies is still striking. The key question is whether 
changes in the increasingly integrated international financial sector will inevitably 
undermine state autonomy and the concomitant capacity to influence economic 
outcomes. 
 
In this regard, the financial crises of the late 1990s revealed the different ways East 
Asian economies had already integrated with the wider international system and 
raised important questions about the state’s role in this process. The crisis itself has 
generated a voluminous literature and there is no intention of adding to this here,20 but 
it is important to note a number of issues the crisis highlighted. The first point to 
make is that the biggest economy in the region – Japan’s – was already experiencing 
economic difficulties that pre-dated the crisis by nearly a decade. Although Japanese 
officials plainly made a number of ‘mistakes’ in their management of the rise and fall 
of the ‘bubble economy’, it is significant that the bubble itself emerged in the wake of 
the liberalisation of Japan’s financial sector. Old relationships between industrial and 
financial interests in Japan had already begun to weaken as corporations accessed 
offshore finance.21 Heightened competition in a liberalised domestic environment 
fuelled dubious lending practices and rampant speculation in property and equity 
markets. As a consequence, the ‘Japanese model’ began to unravel.  It is important to 
recognise, however, that this unravelling had Japanese origins: the shift to deficit 
financing by the Japanese government from the 1970s onwards made liberalisation 
and a diminution of governmental control almost inevitable.22 In addition, 
increasingly self-serving relationships between business and government meant that 
much of the money raised by successive Japanese governments was wasted on 
politically powerful lobby groups rather than broader developmental goals. 
 
Even if Japan’s problems were largely indigenously generated, the problems 
confronting other countries often had a significant external component. Indeed, the 
second point to make about the Asian crisis, is that those countries that were most 
badly affected by the crisis were also the most exposed to the international financial 
system. Although there undoubtedly were problems with ‘crony capitalism’ in South 
Korea, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia, which led to Japanese-style policy mistakes 
and a misallocation of resources, there is now widespread agreement that ‘excessively 
rapid financial and capital market liberalization was probably the single most 
important cause of the crisis’.23 Inadequately regulated domestic financial markets 
and institutions, combined with a frequently poor understanding of the implications 
that flow from opening the capital account, led to a rapid build up of foreign debt - 
especially short-term - establishing the preconditions for capital flight, chaos and 
crisis.  
 
The other factor the crisis highlighted that had particular implications for East Asia’s 
developmental states was the rise of other non-state actors as centres of power and 
authoritative decision making. Not only did the IMF play a (generally resented and 
much criticised) high profile role in managing the crisis, but it became apparent that 
other actors – be it emerging market managers or the credit rating agencies that 
informed them – had become pivotal players influencing the movements of mobile 
financial capital.24 Significantly, and despite much post-crisis talk about the need to 
reform the ‘international financial architecture’, which was widely blamed for the 
rapid and destructive unfolding of the crisis, little has changed. This is unsurprising: 
the ability of ‘Wall Street’ to influence American policy and the pivotal role the 
United States continues to play in shaping the rules of the international financial game 
mean that the prevailing order is likely to continue despite concerns about its stability 
and impact.25 
 
This is all the more remarkable when we consider that the third major point to emerge 
from the crisis is that those countries that were least affected were also least integrated 
into the international financial system: China’s currency was non-convertible, Hong 
Kong maintained a currency board, while Taiwan’s formidable foreign exchange 
reserves, high domestic savings, and relatively independent financial regulators 
rendered it relatively immune to external pressures. 26 However, all this may change. 
China, for example,  is coming under increased pressure from the United States to 
‘float’ its currency in the hope that this will rectify the latter’s chronic trade deficit. 
Given that a similar policy toward Japan in the 1980s led to the development of the 
bubble economy and did little to fix the trade imbalance, there is no reason to suppose 
such a policy will succeed in China’s case. What it does illustrate, however, is that the 
international economic system will continue to be shaped by the actions of powerful 
nations, and that such power may be exercised indirectly: China’s accession to the 
World Trade Organisation under terms and conditions established by the most 
powerful capitalist countries exemplifies the new order in which East Asian states 
find themselves increasingly constrained by powerful intergovernmental agencies and 
non-state actors.27 
 
The End of the Developmental State? 
 
Thus, the state in East Asia is, like its counterparts elsewhere, having to come to terms 
with processes of globalisation that threaten to undermine its capacity to influence the 
course of economic development. In the Anglo-American economies like the United 
States, Britain and Australia this is not necessarily such a problem. On the contrary, 
the apparent diminution of state power and influence over the economy is entirely in 
keeping with a neoliberal ideology that normatively privileges markets over 
governments, and is something state policy has actually encouraged. In East Asia, by 
contrast, where the legitimacy and authority of ruling elites frequently hinges on their 
capacity to deliver economic growth, if states are generally in retreat then this 
presents a more fundamental challenge to a region which has risen to prominence in 
large part as a consequence of state activism. 
 
In deciding whether East Asia’s developmental state is in terminal decline, two 
questions loom large: first, is it certain that states generally are losing their capacity to 
act effectively and authoritatively? Second, does the developmental state in particular 
have a limited life-span, after which it should be reconfigured if it is not to become 
self-serving and counter-productive? These are plainly large questions and answers to 
them can only be sketched here. 
 
As far as the state of the state is concerned, the East Asian experience serves as a 
cautionary reminder that generalisation is difficult. While the countries of Northeast 
Asia may have had a highly developed ability to devise and implement policy, in 
much of Southeast Asia state sovereignty was frequently incompletely realised even 
before the processes associated with globalisation intensified.28 Nevertheless, a 
number of scholars have argued that globalisation has done little to undermine either 
the capacity or the necessity for states to shape economic outcomes. Linda Weiss, for 
example, suggests that, not only have states retained a considerable degree of ‘room 
for manoeuvre’ in policy making, but ‘globalisation also contributes to the expansion 
of governing capacities through both the transformation of public-private sector 
relations and the growth of policy networks’.29 Certainly this might seem to apply to 
many ‘developed’ economies where (even in the Anglo-American countries) 
governments generally account for an increasing share of economic activity and an 
array of non-governmental or quasi state agencies facilitate new modes of governance 
and state influence. In parts of East Asia, however, where the non-state sector is not as 
well developed or independent, claims about the potential reconfiguring of public-
private relations look more dubious.30 
 
In such circumstances, therefore, what much of Southeast Asia in particular needs is 
more state capacity and intervention rather than less. There are two compelling 
reasons for advancing this argument. On the one hand, as Ha Joon Chang has pointed 
out, all those states that have successfully developed sophisticated industrial 
economies have done so with the assistance of developmental states.31 This applies to 
both interventionist East Asian governments like Japan, and to the original 
industrialising nations like Britain and later the United States. The degree of 
collective amnesia about their own historical development on the part of many in ‘the 
West’ consequently makes the advocacy of economic liberalisation and a winding 
back of the developmental state in East Asia hypocritical at best, self-serving and 
discriminatory at worst. Put simply, political elites in the developed world and the 
powerful non-state and intergovernmental agencies that constitute the international 
regulatory architecture are effectively depriving developing nations of an important 
mechanism for promoting development – a mechanism their predecessors used to 
facilitate their own economic expansion. This is especially troubling given that the 
historical record also suggests that, even though Southeast Asian states have had less 
capacity to develop and  implement industrial developmental policies than their 
Northeast Asian counterparts, there is, as Jomo points out,  ‘little doubt that the 
structural  transformation and industrialization of these economies have gone well 
beyond what would have been achieved by relying exclusively on market forces and 
private sector initiatives’.32 
 
Equally importantly – and this is the second major argument in favour of enhanced 
state capacity and continuing  intervention in economic activity - in the contemporary, 
increasingly integrated international economy, governments need to manage and 
oversee the manner in which small, vulnerable economies are integrated with the 
potentially volatile and highly destabilising flows of mobile capital that emanate from 
the world’s capital markets. Indeed, governments in the developing world need to 
think carefully about whether flows of financial or portfolio capital are useful at all. 
Discriminating between, and developing suitable policy responses toward, long-term 
direct foreign investment and short-term flows of highly mobile, speculative capital is 
a key part of this process. In short, as far as many developing economies are 
concerned, an effective, relatively independent and non-corrupt developmental state is 
still a potentially critical part of economic progress and mechanism for mediating 
global forces. 
 
Creating and maintaining the sort of ideal-typical state-business relationship described 
by the likes of Evans and Weiss is plainly not a simple matter, however. Not only are 
such strategies at odds with the prevailing ideological climate and likely to be 
challenged by powerful international actors, but there are legitimate concerns about 
whether they are achievable without creating self-serving and corrupt relationships. 
The experience of Japan suggests that however effective the developmental state may 
be initially, there is a very real danger that it will be captured by vested interests, 
making it an obstacle to, rather than a promoter of, much needed reform. The 
Japanese case also suggests that once the developmental state has effectively done its 
job and ‘caught up’ with established industrial economies at the leading edge of 
production and knowledge, it is far from clear that state planners are any wiser about 
the course of future technological development than the private sector.33 In other 
words, there are limits to what states can do, specific circumstances in which planned 
development seems to be effective, and a danger of entrenching a counter-productive 
institutional inertia where the relationships between political and economic elites are 
inadequately monitored and transparent, or where they linger on past their use by 
dates. 
 
Ultimately, therefore, the relative long-term decline of the state may be inevitable and 
no bad thing. The East Asian experience reminds us that the price of state-led 
development can be authoritarianism, corruption and a fairly cavalier attitude toward 
the environment and human rights. Moreover, political and  economic theorists have 
rightly drawn attention to both the conceptual and normative problems that revolve 
around nationally-based frameworks of understanding and action.34 Nevertheless, if 
parts of the world that are presently ‘underdeveloped’ economically are to experience 
rising living standards and be integrated into the global economy on more favourable 
terms, the historical record strongly suggests that states continue to be critically 
important: even in an era of globalisation, states retain a significant potential capacity 
to influence domestic economic outcomes and the way broadly conceived national 
economic spaces are articulated with the wider global system. Consequently, if parts 
of the developing world - not just in Southeast Asia, but also in Eastern Europe, Latin 
America and especially Africa - are to move up the ladder of economic development, 
they may still need to employ some of the same sorts of coordinated, interventionist, 
state-led strategies that underpinned Northeast Asia’s rise during its most successful 
period.  
 
Whether they will have the necessary sort of domestic capacity and permissive 
international environment that might allow them to do so is, of course, another 
question. At a time when the United States is no longer constrained by wider geo-
political imperatives, and much more willing to act unilaterally in pursuit of what it 
takes to be its national interest, then it is entirely possible that the international 
ideational and political environment will remain hostile to state activism, despite 
compelling evidence that for some counties it may still be the key to successful 
economic development. 
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